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Imre Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes - An Overview 
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) was one of the modern philosophers of science and 
mathematics. His main contribution to philosophy was the development of the concept of 
methodology of scientific research programmes and the use of this methodology in the rational 
reconstruction of science. Lakatos presents his methodology in contrast to the systems proposed 
by Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, though from each he took over ideas, accepting a modified 
falsifiability and the Kuhn paradigm that he adapted to the system he proposed: 
"According to my methodology the great scientific achievements are research programmes which 
can be evaluated in terms of progressive and degenerating problemshifts; and scientific 
revolutions consist of one research programme superseding (overtaking in progress) 
another. This methodology offers a pew rational reconstruction of science. It is best 
presented by contrasting it with falsification ism and conventionalism, from both of which 
it borrows essential elements." [p 110] 
Practically, Lakatos uses Popper's falsifiability at the level of scientific theories, but rather 
accepting Feyerabend's methodological tolerance, and his research programmes can be identified 
up to a point with Kuhn' scientific revolutions. 
The methodology of scientific research programs is a collection of papers published over 
time expressing a radical review of Popper's demarcation criterion between science and non-
science, leading to a new theory of scientific rationality. Volume I address aspects of the 
philosophy of science, and volume II contains works on the philosophy of mathematics. 
For a science historian, the reconstruction proposed by Lakatos is attractive and explains 
the evolution of science to a level that has not been achieved before. The basic evaluation unit 
proposed by Lakatos - the research programme - and especially the dynamics of these programmes, 
how they appear, develops, matures, degenerates and then replaced by other better research 
programmes is, in my opinion, a reconstruction of science much closer to truth than Kuhn's 
paradigms. 
Although all sections of the book deal with the same main idea, they are relatively 
autonomous. But who wishes to understand in detail Lakatos' proposed methodology on which to 
develop a rational history of science must carefully pass through at least two of these sections: 
"Falsification and methodology of scientific research programs" describing, according to the 
author, the basic evaluation unit "of the methodology, and "The history of science and its rational 
reconstructions," which explains how research methodology can be used to reconstruct science as 
close as possible to the real situation, in a rational way: "The methodology of scientific research 
programmes constitutes, like any other methodology, a historiographical research programme. The 
historian who accepts this methodology as a guide will look in history for rival research 
programmes, for progressive and degenerating problemshifts." [p 114] 
In "Introduction", Lakatos begins with an analysis of proposed solutions and problems with 
these solutions for the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. According to Lakatos, the 
typical descriptive unity of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis, but "a 
powerful problem-solving machinery, which, with the help of sophisticated mathematical 
techniques, digests anomalies and even turns them into positive evidence." [p 4] In a partially 
humorous approach ("Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory merely because 
facts contradict it." [p 4]), an anomaly for Lakatos is not the same as a rejection for Popper. The 
"machinery" proposed by Lakatos for the research program is like an army, with a similar fighting 
strategy, in which it first attempts to bring anomalies ("enemies") to the program, turning them 
into positive evidence. If this test falls, they are simply ignored. 
After a presentation of the main theories of knowledge, Lakatos proposes a modification 
of Popper's criterion, which he calls "sophisticated methodological falsificationism". From this 
perspective, the delimitation criterion should apply not to a hypothesis or to an isolated theory, but 
rather to a whole research programme. Sophisticated falsificationism thus changes the question of 
how the theories are evaluated to the question of how to evaluate the series of theories. It is not an 
isolated theory, but only a series of theories that can be considered to be scientific or non-scientific: 
the application of the term "scientific" to a single theory is a misconduct. But the problem of 
sophisticated falsification lies precisely in the multitude of theories considered. In the case of two 
incompatible theories, we have to go back to the conventional aspects of methodological 
falsificationism or to the incontestable hypotheses of dogmatic falsificationism to make a choice. 
Using new corroborated facts involves a clear delimitation between observational and theoretical 
terms, with conventional decisions on what constitutes "basic" knowledge. 
"Neojustificationist honesty demanded the specification of the probability of any hypothesis in the 
light of the available empirical evidence. The honesty of naive falsification ism demanded 
the testing of the falsifiable and the rejection of the unfalsifiable and the falsified. Finally, 
the honesty of sophisticated falsificationism demanded that one should try to look at things 
from different points of view, to put forward new theories which anticipate novel facts, and 
to reject theories which have been superseded by more powerful ones." [p 38] 
